Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences
Volume 24

Number 5

Article 55

1-1-2016

An IPR protection scheme based on wavelet transformation and
visual cryptography
YOUNG CHANG HOU
A-YU TSENG
ZEN-YU QUAN
HSIN-JU LIU

Follow this and additional works at: https://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik
Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Sciences Commons, and the Electrical and
Computer Engineering Commons

Recommended Citation
HOU, YOUNG CHANG; TSENG, A-YU; QUAN, ZEN-YU; and LIU, HSIN-JU (2016) "An IPR protection scheme
based on wavelet transformation and visual cryptography," Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and
Computer Sciences: Vol. 24: No. 5, Article 55. https://doi.org/10.3906/elk-1405-180
Available at: https://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik/vol24/iss5/55

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TÜBİTAK Academic Journals. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences by an authorized editor of TÜBİTAK
Academic Journals. For more information, please contact academic.publications@tubitak.gov.tr.

Turkish Journal of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences
http://journals.tubitak.gov.tr/elektrik/

Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci
(2016) 24: 4063 – 4082
c TÜBİTAK
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Abstract: As information technology is fast developing, it brings great convenience to our everyday life. However,
hackers may also access confidential data illegally and easily from computers over the Internet. Therefore, how to
protect property rights against infringement is an essential issue. Digital watermarking is a method that adds personal
information to an intellectual property to protect one’s ownership rights. Should the intellectual property be disputed,
the owner can retrieve the watermark and prove ownership rights. Based on the principles of visual cryptography and the
law of large numbers, our study generates shares by comparing pseudorandomly selected value pairs during the processes
of embedding and verifying the hidden watermark. The wavelet transformation coeﬃcients of the LL 3 region are used as
the sample population. Experimental results indicate that our method has good robustness against darkening, lightening,
blurring, sharpening, noising, distortion, jitter, JPEG, and cropping attacks. There are 3 advantages to our method: 1)
robustness is retained when the protected image suﬀers from attacks; 2) unexpanded shares are created to reduce the
size of every share; 3) the embedded watermark is decoded by the human visual system during the verification process.
Key words: Digital watermarking, wavelet transformation, visual cryptography, law of large numbers, copyright
protection

1. Introduction
With the advent of the digital age and the rapid development of network bandwidth, information delivery is
easier and faster than ever. The general public can surf the Internet for information they want at any time
and any place. However, from another perspective, although retrieving information easily is indeed one of the
advantages of the new era, without proper protection of information from being stolen and tampered with,
protection of property ownership cannot be guaranteed. Nowadays, numerous mechanisms for protection of
intellectual property rights (IPR) have been proposed, including digital watermarking technology.
Digital watermarking refers to using characteristics that human eyes cannot notice, i.e. the subtle changes
caused by embedding a set of digital signals into a digital image. These signals can be a trademark, personal
data, etc. When it is necessary to verify ownership of the data, the original embedded signals can be extracted
from the image via the watermark extraction process. The person can then claim that he or she owns this
property. The purpose of the protection of IPR is then achieved. This set of digital signals is called the
“watermark”.
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Watermarking technology can be classified into diﬀerent categories according to the attributes of watermark visibility, resistance against attacks, embedding methods, and extraction methods [1,2]. For visibility, it
can be divided into 2 types: visible and invisible; by the strength of its resistance to attacks, it can be classified
into 3 types: robust, fragile, and semifragile; by diﬀerent watermark extraction methods, it can be classified
into 3 groups: the blind, nonblind, and semiblind; and by embedding methods, it can be divided into the spatial
domain [3,4] and the frequency domain [5–10].
The concept of visual cryptography was originally proposed by Naor and Shamir [11] as a mechanism
for protecting information. The secret image is decomposed into multiple haphazard share images (shares). To
decrypt, we can simply superimpose these sharing images and take advantage of the human visual system to
visualize the secret content of the stacked shares without any need for complex computation.
Since the concept of visual cryptography was proposed, several related works [12–28] have been presented.
However, Naor and Shamir’s visual cryptography has the drawback that the size of share images needs to be
extended to several times larger than that of the original secret image, which results in image distortion and
waste of storage. To handle this problem, Ito et al. [26] utilized the concept of probability and proposed a
pixel nonexpansion method in which the share images have the same size as the secret image. While Ito et al.’s
method avoids the problem of pixel expansion, the randomly selected sharing pixels may destroy the patterns
of pixel distribution on share images. This may cause a messy visual eﬀect on the superimposed image. Tu
and Hou [28] proposed a multipixel encryption scheme. They used each continuous m white (black) pixel of
the secret image as an encrypted object, which ensured that each corresponding m -white-pixel ( m-black-pixel)
area of the share images had an equal probability to be black. The chaos of the share images is well controlled
and thus the superimposed image can have higher quality of visual eﬀects.
As the decryption process of visual cryptography does not require computing machines, many works
began to apply visual cryptography to the watermarking field [12–21]. Hou [12] employed the highest bit-plane
of the secret image to produce the share images needed in visual cryptography, but the drawback is that the
size of the share images is twice that of the secret one. Hsu and Hou [13] produced share images by comparing
the sample means with the population mean of the secret image based on the central limit theorem. One of the
drawbacks of this technique is that, to ensure the security of share images, its sampling process must strictly
comply with the statistical norm of the normal distribution. Another drawback is that the share images and
the restored image are expanded to 4 times the original one. Hou and Huang [14] improved on Hsu and Hou’s
[13] shortcomings. They used the statistical characteristics of the law of large numbers to produce nonexpanded
share images through comparing randomly selected pixel pairs. However, when the image has been attacked,
employing a single pixel value to perform the comparison is more vulnerable than engaging the sample mean of
a plurality of pixels. Because after some attacks those pixel pairs with diﬀerent values might have equal values,
or those pairs with an equal pixel value might have unequal values, it tends to result in diﬀerent consequences
when those 2 pixels are compared. This will cause more errors when retrieving the watermark.
The aforementioned methods are based on the spatial domain. The major problem of the spatial domain
is its weak robustness after receiving an attack. Therefore, most of the watermarking researchers have focused
on the frequency domain. The common practice is to exploit diﬀerent transformation technologies to convert the
pixel values of the image in the spatial domain to amplitude coeﬃcients in the frequency domain. The advantages
of the frequency domain include not only its better resistance to attacks, but also its varying information
importance represented by diverse frequencies. Therefore, we can perform diﬀerent levels of processing to an
image in accordance with the importance of diﬀerent frequencies and user requirements.
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Rawat and Raman [15] proposed a copyright protection scheme based on fractional Fourier transform,
singular value decomposition, and visual cryptography. The first singular value of each 4 × 4 image block
is collected as the population base. Each singular value is then compared with the average singular value to
determine how to generate the shares needed. Singh et al. [16] proposed a copyright protection scheme for
video. Scene changes are detected from the video by first applying the histogram diﬀerence method to the
video stream. The frames mean of the same scene of the video is then compared with the global mean to
generate the shares needed. Benyoussef et al. [17] proposed a copyright protection scheme based on the dual
tree complex wavelet transform where 7 × 7 LL subblocks are randomly selected and the average LL coeﬃcient
of each subblock is then calculated. The subblock average is compared with the average of all LL subbands
to generate the shares. The main concept of [15–17] is quite similar to that of [13]; the only diﬀerence is the
method of selecting the population base. However, the sampling methods in [15–17] need more computation
time than those in [12–14]. In addition, the locality eﬀect of the frames mean in [16] may prevent the share
image from having disorderly 1/2 black dots and 1/2 white dots, which compromises the security requirements
of visual cryptography. Luo et al. [18] used the QR (quick response) code as the watermark and proposed a
watermarking scheme based on the dual transform domains of discrete wavelet transform and discrete fractional
random transform. Unlike [12–17], Luo et al. [18] embedded the watermark into the original host image, which
may degrade the quality of the original image; this is the reason why their watermark size is only 25 × 25,
which is much smaller than the size of the protected image.
Chang et al. [19] extracted DC coeﬃcients from the original image to produce share images. Hsieh
et al. [20] extracted a feature from every 4 neighborhood LL 2 (second-level low-frequency band) coeﬃcients
of wavelet transformation of the host image to produce the share images. Lou et al. [21] also used wavelet
transformations to extract the coeﬃcients of the medium frequency and the low frequency to generate share
images. The common drawback of the above 3 works is that the sizes of the watermarks have to be much
smaller than the protected images at only 1/144, 1/64, and 1/64, respectively. In addition, Chang et al. [19]
had to calculate the number of white dots in every 3 × 3 block when extracting the watermark to restore the
color of the watermark. Hsieh et al. [20] and Lou et al. [21] needed to do the exclusive-or (XOR) operation on
share images. All 3 methods were unable to take advantage of visual cryptography to decrypt the superimposed
images by using only the human visual system.
This research aims to improve the abovementioned drawbacks. The authors employed a nonexpanded
scheme and used the method of embedding the watermark in the frequency domain to produce share images
with good resistance to attacks. Once the protected image encountered an attack, the watermark could still
be extracted robustly. The process of extracting the watermark uses the mechanism of visual cryptography.
By superimposing share images, the watermark emerges naturally without the help of any complex arithmetic
computation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we concisely introduce the
related background of the proposed scheme. In Section 3, the proposed protection schemes are presented. The
experimental results and comparisons with related studies appear in Section 4. Finally, conclusions are given
in Section 5.
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2. Literature review
2.1. Visual cryptography
The concept of visual cryptography (VC) was first proposed by Naor and Shamir [11]. The idea of VC is to
break the secret image down into n noise-like share images that show no clues about the original image. During
the decryption process, no complex arithmetical computation is required. As long as k (2 ≤ k ≤ n) or more
share images are superimposed, the original secret image will be recovered on the superimposed images and the
content of the secret image can be identified via the human visual system. On the other hand, if the number of
stacked share images is less than k , the secret image will not be restored on the superimposed images. This is
called the (k , n) -threshold ( k -out-of-n threshold) mechanism.
Take the (2, 2)-threshold, for example (Table 1). Each pixel of the secret image will be decomposed into a
1-white-and-1-black image block. When a white pixel of the secret image needs to be shared, the 2 participants
will get image blocks of the same type; when sharing a black secret pixel, both will get the complementary
blocks. Thus, when 2 share images are superimposed, the area corresponding to the secret white pixels will
show half-black-and-half-white blocks, and the area corresponding to the black pixels of the secret image will
show as fully black. Hence, the superimposed images will be shown at 50% contrast, and the human visual
system can easily tell the content of the secret information.
Table 1. The sharing model of the (2, 2)-threshold visual cryptography scheme.

Secret image

Share 1

Share 2

Stacked image

2.2. Watermarking technology
In terms of the embedding method, the watermarking technology can be classified into 2 types, the spatial
domain [3,4] and the frequency domain [5–10]. To represent the image as a collection of pixels is one way of
presenting the image in the spatial domain. If each pixel is composed of several bits, the image can then be shown
in diﬀerent colors. The watermark embedding methods in the spatial domain often modify the least significant
bits of an image pixel directly. Due to the characteristics of the human eye, one is unable to distinguish the
slight change in pixels. This method uses relatively simple calculation and has low computational loading. The
2 most common watermarking techniques of the spatial domain are the least significant bit method [29,30] and
the patchwork method [31,32]. However, in order to keep the original image from revealing any clues about
the watermark, the amount of information that can be hidden in an image becomes small. Moreover, as the
embedded information is placed directly into the bits of image pixels, it has high sensitivity and thus low
resistance to attacks.
We can also regard an image as the superimposed result of the waveforms of various frequencies. Generally
speaking, the change between the pixels of the low-frequency region is smaller. The low-frequency regions, which
usually constitute the most important part of the whole image, look visually smoother and clearer. In contrast,
pixels of the high-frequency region have a larger variance. The high-frequency regions, which usually represent
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the boundary of the image block, look visually discontinuous and messy. Through mathematical computation,
we can convert the pixel values of the original image (in a data form of spatial domain) to the waveforms
of diﬀerent frequencies (in a data form of frequency domain). After the transformation process, the diﬀerent
frequency portions of the image are separated oﬀ, and the amplitudes of the wave of diﬀerent frequencies are
produced. The method for watermark embedding in the frequency domain is to modify the amplitudes of some
frequencies based on the watermark one wishes to embed.
As the low-frequency region is the most important part of the image, and the human visual system is
more sensitive to changes in low-frequency regions, any subtle change is likely to be detected by the human
eye. Therefore, we usually do not hide the watermark information in a low-frequency region, to improve the
imperceptibility of the watermark. On the other hand, humans do not easily detect small changes in the
high-frequency region. In terms of visual quality, the high-frequency region is less important as compared to
the low-frequency region. Therefore, it is the first target to be processed by all image processing software.
Hence, to increase the robustness of the watermark, the watermark information will not usually be hidden in
the high-frequency region, either. Between the low and high frequencies is the intermediate-frequency band,
which has moderate sensitivity to modification and visual quality and is the most suitable place for most
watermarking technologies to embed their watermarks. The advantage of frequency domain watermarking
techniques is their better resistance to attacks, but the watermark computational process is also more complex
than those in the spatial domain. In frequency domain watermarking techniques, discrete cosine transform
(DCT) [5,6], fast Fourier transform (FFT) [1], and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) [7–10] are the 3 most
common transformation methods.
2.3. Discrete wavelet transform
There are many ways to transform images from the spatial domain to the frequency domain. The Haar wavelet
transform (HWT) [33] is one of the most common methods. During the transformation process, the wavelet
function performs the arithmetic summation and diﬀerence operations on the gray values of every adjacent pixel
pair, 2 pixels at a time. The mean value of every pixel pair, called the approximation coeﬃcient, is allocated in
the first half of the sequences, and the mean value of each pairwise subtraction, called the detail coeﬃcient, is
placed in the rear section. The process continues row-wise first until the entire image is processed. The same
procedure is then performed in every column of the image. The amplitude coeﬃcients in the frequency domain
of the image, as shown in Figures 1a and 1b, can then be obtained.
As the average of pixel values retains the most important information that can be used to best represent
most of the image’s appearance, these portions of data are more important in displaying the image. In addition,
as most adjacent pixels have little diﬀerence in value, the variations between them are much more moderate
after the pairwise average operation. Therefore, this area is referred to as the low-frequency region (upper left of
Figure 1). On the contrary, the subtraction results represent the gaps between pixels. As most adjacent pixels
have only small diﬀerences in value, most of the subtraction results are close to 0. Only at the edges of the
image blocks will the diﬀerences between adjacent pixels become greater, and dramatic enough to particularly
highlight the image contours. Hence, we refer to this area as the high-frequency region (bottom right of Figure
1). Repeating the abovementioned transformation operation in the low-frequency region, we can get a higher
level result for the discrete wavelet transformation (Figure 1b).
Since data of the low-frequency LL 3 region (upper left region in Figure 1b) are the average results of
64 corresponding pixel values, these values are more representative of their original pixels. Even when the
protected image is under attack, the LL 3 coeﬃcients are not easily modified to any great degree. In our
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research, 2 pseudorandomly selected LL 3 coeﬃcients were compared to determine the content of the share
images needed in visual cryptography. Due to the conservative property of LL 3 coeﬃcients, the comparison
results can be almost identical before and after suﬀering attacks, which ensures better robustness.

Figure 1. Diﬀerent results of DWT: a) the result after 1-level DWT; b) the result after 3-level DWT.

Although conventional watermarking algorithms in the wavelet domain are operating either on a subband
or a block base, some researchers, for example, Barni et al. [10], adapted the watermark strength pixel-wise by
taking into account the texture and the luminance content of all of the image subband. The watermark strength
is modulated according to the local image characteristics and is accomplished through a mask, giving a pixelby-pixel measure of the sensibility of the human eye to local image perturbations. Performance improvement
on watermark robustness and invisibility is obtained by means of exploiting the characteristics of the human
visual system.
2.4. The law of large numbers
In any large group of individuals, there will be individual diﬀerences owing to various contingent factors. When
we focus on a single individual, its behavior will be disorganized, irregular, and diﬃcult to predict. However,
due to the operation of the law of large numbers, the entire group as a whole will appear in some kind of stable
manner [34]. For example, when we roll the dice, any number between 1 and 6 may appear on any throw of
the dice. Each time, the number changes randomly. Although the results of these throws will be an irregular
number series, the occurrences of the various figures will conform to a stable uniform probability distribution,
which will be close to 1 in 6 if we throw the dice a large number of times. Using the example of the dice, the
individuals of a group may seem unrelated and diverse, but an indicator reflecting the group’s condition will
tend to keep steady with limited variation when the group is suﬃciently large. This is due to the operation of
the law of large numbers.
According to Bernoulli’s definition of the law of large numbers, if nA is the number of occurrences of
event A in n independent tests, and p the probability of A’s occurrence in each test, then for any ε >0, we have
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lim Prob

n→∞

{

nA
n

}
− p < ε = 1; i.e.

nA
n

will get closer to p as n approaches infinity. Bernoulli’s law of large

numbers states that, when n is large, the probability that event A occurs will be very close to the probability
p . In practice, how many tests should be done in all so that the probability that the diﬀerence between nA and
n

p is less than a particular value ε will be greater than 1 – α ? According to an estimation of Bernoulli’s law of
{ nA
}
1
large numbers, n must satisfy the condition n ≥ 4αε
2 so that Prob
n − p < ε ≥ 1 − α can be met, where
0 <α <1. Take flipping a coin, for example. The result of a flip is either a head or a tail, which means that
each side has a probability of p = 1/2. If fn represents the probability of heads occurring in the first n tests,
we will have to toss n ≥

1
4·(0.01)·(0.02)2

=

1
0.000016

= 62,500 times to have a 99% probability that the diﬀerence

between fn and p is less than 0.02.

3. Proposed watermarking model
3.1. Theoretical bases
Watermark embedding techniques must often take the following points into account. First, for spatial domain
embedding methods, decisions on the quantity and the location of the hidden information are particularly
critical, to avoid making them too easily found. Their utility also decreases with these restrictions. Second,
for frequency domain embedding methods, the computation is more complex and requires more calculation in
the processes of watermark embedding and extraction. Third, adding a watermark will modify the information
of the original image, which may destroy the quality of the original image. Fourth, nonblind watermarking
methods often need to refer to the original image when extracting the watermark. If the original image cannot
be accessed, the watermark will not be extracted either. This will inhibit the flexibility of watermark verification
in ownership disputes.
The concept of visual cryptography is to produce some half-black and half-white share images from the
corresponding secret image. When those share images are superimposed, the content of the secret image can
be revealed. Therefore, when given a previously registered share image for identity authentication, if we can
produce another share image from the controversial image and the superimposed image of these 2 shares can
show the watermark we need, the purpose of verifying IPR is achieved.
In this study, the basic concept is that every share image processed by the visual cryptography scheme
has 50% black points and 50% white points in it. From the viewpoint of coding theory, each share image
is a series of 0s and 1s. If we can generate the proper 0/1 series from the protected digital asset (protected
image, P ), then we can produce the share image (master share, M ) we need. With the master share (M ) and
the watermark ( W ), following the encryption rules of visual cryptography, we can create another share image
(ownership share, O). The master share (M ) , which represents some features of the protected image, can be
discarded, but the ownership share (O), which represents the certificate of our identity authentication, should
be kept. We can register this ownership share (O) to a certification authority (CA), and then use it to verify
our intellectual property rights in the future, as shown in Figure 2.
If there are disputes over the ownership of the intellectual property someday, we can simply generate the
master sharert( M ′ ) from the controversial image and superimpose it onto the ownership share (O) registered
to the CA. If the result shows the watermark information, the ownership of this asset is proved to be ours. This
method achieves the purpose of ownership verification, as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 2. The model of applying visual cryptography to embed a watermark.

Figure 3. The verification process of the digital asset.

There are 2 advantages to applying visual cryptography to the watermarking mechanism. First, the
original image remains intact. As the watermark is not actually embedded into the original image, the image will
not be damaged. This benefit is particularly suitable for applications where the original images are not allowed
to be modified, such as medical images, satellite images, and so on. Second, the watermark is easily extracted.
By superimposing the share images on each other, we can take advantage of the human visual system to extract
the watermark. This extraction process does not need complex mathematical calculation, even without the
aid of computers. Therefore, the research that combines visual cryptography and the watermarking technology
focuses on how to obtain the 0/1 series of the share image (master share, M ) through the protected asset, and
how to combine the master share and the watermark to produce another share image (ownership share, O) for
verifying ownership.
We found that an image can usually maintain a certain image quality when subjected to attacks by some
image processing software. That is, after being attacked, the original image still keeps the same mountains
or the same seas; a red region is still red and a green part is also kept green. Although the pixel values of
the attacked image have been changed, the appearance is almost the same as before. It is not diﬃcult to find
that the gray value distribution of the image pixels, owing to the statistical conservation property, will not be
changed significantly and will still maintain a certain regularity.
This study combines probability theory, the law of large numbers, and the transformation of the frequency
domain with the characteristics of nonexpanded visual cryptography to construct a digital image protection
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scheme for IPR. First of all, we adopt the frequency domain approach by performing a 3-level HWT to the
protected image ( P ). Because each coeﬃcient of the LL 3 low-frequency band compresses the values of 64
corresponding pixels, it retains the most plentiful information about the original image. We then compare 2
pixel values (a , b) of each pixel pair that is pseudorandomly retrieved from the LL 3 data. Only the 2 cases of
(a ≥ b) and ( a ≤ b) may occur.
According to the law of large numbers, the occurrence probabilities of the cases (a > b) and ( a < b) are
equal. As for the case (a = b) , the half of which whose sum of pixel coordinates is even can be classified into
the ( a> b) case; the other half whose sum of pixel coordinates is odd can be classified into the (a< b) case. In
this method, all results of the comparison may seem like a chaotic arrangement initially, but according to the
law of large numbers, the occurrence count of case ( a ≥ b) or ( a ≤ b) will be very close to half of the number
of tests. Take a 256 × 256 watermark, for example. There will be at least 65,000 trials executed. When the
case of ( a ≥ b) appears, we will produce a black point (1) on the master share ( M ); when the case of ( a ≤ b)
appears, we will produce a white point (0) instead. Thus, we can let the share image have half black dots and
half white dots to meet the security requirements of visual cryptography.
When the protected image ( P ) encounters an attack, because the LL 3 coeﬃcients are less sensitive to
the image attack, the comparison results of the coeﬃcient pairs will not be changed easily. In the course of this
study, we could still extract a master sharer (M ′ ) with good robustness. Therefore, when the identity of the
intellectual asset needs to be verified, the master shareec(M ′ ) is produced from the asset first. Then, given the
ownership share (O) in our possession, if both the master and ownership shares can be superimposed to show
the watermark, we can claim that the ownership of the asset is ours. Thus, the aim of ownership verification of
the intellectual asset is achieved.
3.2. Protection method of the digital image copyright
The image protection process can be divided into 2 parts: the first part is to produce the ownership share of
the digital asset and the second part is to verify ownership.
3.2.1. Watermark embedding: establishment of digital image ownership
In the production process of the digital asset’s ownership share, the ownership share (O) is regarded as the
object to be produced. After a 3-level HWT, all LL 3 band coeﬃcients are extracted as the population base.
Based on the pixel-sharing rules of visual cryptography, we embed the watermark (W ) into 2 corresponding
share images, which are called the master share (M ) and the ownership share (O) . The details of the processing
steps are shown in Figure 4.
The watermark embedding algorithm produces 2 share images: the master share (M ) and the ownership
share ( O). In order to achieve the purpose of ownership verification, after these 2 share images are generated,
we register the ownership share (O), as well as the seed ( S) , to a certification authority (CA) in case of the
need for authentication in the future. The master share (M ) can then be discarded.
3.2.2. Watermark extraction: ownership verification of the digital image
The second part of the image protection process, the ownership verification process of the digital asset, is shown
in Figure 5. If there is a controversial image (P ′ ) and we want to verify its ownership, first we execute a 3-level
HWT on this image and extract the coeﬃcients from the LL 3 block as the population base to produce a master
4071

HOU et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

sharee ( M ′ ). Then we superimpose the generated master sharemp( M ′ ) onto the ownership share (O) that we
keep on hand for identity verification. If the superimposed image can reveal the watermark patterns, it means
that the ownership of this controversial image P ′ has been verified, and the image belongs to the person who
owns the ownership share ( O) and the seed ( S).

Figure 4. The watermark embedding process.

Figure 5. The verification process of the watermark.

3.2.3. Verification of the similarity between the attacked image and the original image
If an image encounters a critical attack, the attacked image will become less similar to the original image
and may lose information about the embedded watermark. Therefore, if the extracted watermark can remain
similar to the original one, the corresponding watermark embedding technology is said to be good at contributing
high resistance to attacks or image processing. The more similar the extracted watermark is to the original
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watermark, the higher resistance the embedding technology shows to attacks, or the better the embedding
technology is. Because the sensitivity of the human visual system is not high enough, sometimes we cannot
recognize the diﬀerences between the attacked image and the original one. Therefore, in order to clearly define
the degree of the image distortion after attacks, people usually employ the peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR)
to measure the distortion of the image. The calculation method is shown in Eqs. (1) and (2):
P SN R = 10 log10

M SE =

2552
,
M SE

m−1
∑ n−1
∑
1
2
(aij − bij ) ,
m × n i=0 j=0

(1)

(2)

where MSE is the mean square error of the 2 m × n grayscale images, aij represents the gray value of the
original image at position ( i, j), and bij represents the gray value of the attacked image at position ( i, j). The
higher the PSNR value is, the more similar these 2 images are. Conversely, if the PSNR value is lower, these
2 images have a lower similarity. Therefore, the PSNR can be used as an approximation to human perception
of reconstruction quality and is commonly used in image science for evaluating the quality of the reconstructed
image. A higher PSNR generally indicates that the reconstruction is of higher quality.
In order to verify the similarity of the extracted watermark and the original one, as a measurement
metric, we take the improved normalized correlation (NC) proposed by Hsu and Hou [13] as follows:
∑ ∑

NC = 

i

′
Wi,j ×Wi,j
j
∑∑ 2
×
Wi,j
i

j

∑∑
i

j

0.5
′
(1 − Wi,j ) × (1−Wi,j
)

∑∑
 ,
2
(1 − Wi,j )
i

(3)

j

where Wij and Wij′ are the pixel values of the original watermark and the extracted watermark at positions
(i , j) , respectively. Suppose that the value of the black pixel is 1 and the value of the white pixel is 0. In the
NC formula, the first part represents the ratio of the black pixels on the original watermark that still remain
black on the extracted watermark. It can accumulate values when both Wij and Wij ’ are 1. The second
part represents the ratio of the white pixels on the original watermark that still remain white on the extracted
watermark. It can accumulate values when both Wij and Wij ’ are 0. The NC value ranges between 0 and 1. If
the value is close to 1, it means that the verified watermark is quite similar to the original one. On the contrary,
if the NC value is close ’to 0, it means that these 2 watermarks have less similarity. The higher the NC value
of the extracted watermark is, the higher resistance to attacks the embedding technology demonstrates, or the
better the embedding technology is.
4. Experimental results and discussion
4.1. Experimental environment
In this study, we ran our experiments using Microsoft Windows XP with Service Pack 3 on a personal computer
equiped with an Intel Core 2 duo processor and 2 GB memory. We used Java SE 6.0 SDK as our program
development tool. The experimental subjects were two 512 × 512 grayscale images, Zelda and Airplane (Figures
6a–6b). The embedded watermark was a 256 × 256 black and white image motto: National Central University:
Sincerity and Simplicity (Figure 6c).
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Figure 6. The protected images and the watermark: a) Zelda (512 × 512); b) Airplane (512 × 512); c) Motto (256 ×
256).

To observe the robustness of the proposed method in resisting various attacks and its unambiguity in
verification, we used Photoshop CS4 as a tool to deliberately perform a variety of destructive attacks. After
that, we employed the NC formula to examine the similarity degree between the watermarks retrieved from the
attacked and the original images. If the NC value was larger, then the watermark generated from the attacked
image was more similar to the original one. We then measured the PSNR value to check the similarity between
the attacked image and the original one. If the PSNR value was lower, it meant that there was a greater
diﬀerence between the 2 images. Generally speaking, if the PSNR value is low and the NC value is high, it
demonstrates that the hidden watermark has a higher resistance to attacks. The results of the experiments are
shown in Table 2.
The experimental results show that, despite a certain degree of destruction that various attacks can cause
to the original image, we are still able to clearly recognize the content presented in the retrieved watermark.
We think that when an image encounters any attack, the basic statistical properties of the image will not be
changed. Perhaps, from a microscopic point of view, every pixel value is subjected to a varying degree of
modification, but from a macroscopic perspective, the original appearance of the image after attacks can still
be recognized; i.e. the original black area is still black and the original white region is still white.
Since data of the low-frequency LL 3 region are the mean values of 64 corresponding pixel values, these
values are more representative of their original pixels and not easily greatly modified. Thus, when the values of
the pixel pairs are compared, the same comparison results as those on the original image can almost be kept,
which ensures greater robustness. Due to the reasons above, general lightening or darkening attacks have almost
no eﬀect on our method and will not alter the extracted watermark at all. The proposed method can also retain
good resistance to a higher compression ratio of the JPEG compression attack. Not only do those attacked
images that look only a little diﬀerent from the original image have a high NC value, but images that encounter
a more severe attack, such as noising, cropping, blurring, and distortion, also keep a high NC value where the
reconstructed watermark can still clearly be identified. This also proves that the watermark produced by the
characteristic of the statistical properties has very good resistance to attacks and can meet the unambiguous
and robust requirements of the digital watermark.
Since our approach employs the concept of nonexpanded visual cryptography, it is necessary to check in
watermark embedding whether the occurrence probability of case (a ≥ b) or case ( a ≤ b) is close to 1/2 as it
will aﬀect the proportion of black to white pixels on the share image. Figure 7 shows the experimental results
of various seeds. The X -axis represents the number of comparisons. The Y -axis represents the ratio of the
occurrence count of case ( a ≥ b) to the total number of comparisons. We found that no matter what the seed
value is, when the number of experiments is in excess of 4000, all ratio values approach 1/2. The gaps between
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Table 2. The experimental results of diﬀerent attacks.

Attacked image

Reconstructed
watermark

Attacked image

Reconstructed
watermark

JPEG 1: JPEG compression at a 1% ratio
PSNR = 34.15 dB
NC = 99.34%

Sharpening 10
PSNR = 25.75 dB
NC = 96.39%

Lightening 20: 20% brighter
PSNR = 21.35 dB
NC = 99.68%

Darkening 20: 20% darker
PSNR = 16.43 dB
NC = 99.64%

Rescaling 1/2: Reduce to 1/2 of the original size
first, and then zoom back to the original size
PSNR = 32.22 dB

NC = 99.10%

Blurring 5:
Gaussian blur (5 pixels)
PSNR = 17.87 dB
NC = 97.29%

Jitter 16: Cut off a 16-pixel column from the
leftmost of the picture, and then append it
to the rightmost side
PSNR = 17.59 dB
NC = 84.29%

Distortion 100:
Geometric Distortion of a 100% ripple effect
PSNR = 18.28 dB
NC = 98.94%
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Table 2. Continued.

Attacked image

Reconstructed
watermark

Reconstructed
watermark

JPEG 1: JPEG compression at a 1% ratio
PSNR = 34.15 dB
NC = 99.34%

Sharpening 10
PSNR = 25.75 dB
NC = 96.39%

Lightening 20: 20% brighter
PSNR = 21.35 dB
NC = 99.68%

Darkening 20: 20% darker
PSNR = 16.43 dB
NC = 99.64%

Rescaling 1/2: Reduce to 1/2 of the original size
first, and then zoom back to the original size
PSNR = 32.22 dB

NC = 99.10%

Blurring 5:
Gaussian blur (5 pixels)
PSNR = 17.87 dB
NC = 97.29%
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Attacked image

Jitter 16: Cut off a 16-pixel column from the
leftmost of the picture, and then append it
to the rightmost side
PSNR = 17.59 dB
NC = 84.29%

Distortion 100:
Geometric Distortion of a 100% ripple effect
PSNR = 18.28 dB
NC = 98.94%
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1/2 and those ratio values are almost 0.01. Therefore, even if the size of the watermark is only 64 × 64, the
number of comparisons can still satisfy the requirement of the law of large numbers.

Figure 7. The verification of the law of large numbers.

4.2. Comparisons of our study with related works
4.2.1. The frequency domain approaches
The approaches of our method and the related works of Chang et al. [19], Hsieh et al. [20], and Lou et al. [21]
all belong to the frequency domain category. Chang et al. [19] divided the original image into 4 × 4 blocks to
extract their DC coeﬃcients respectively after the DCT. They used the concept of pixel expansion to generate
the share image with a size 3 × 3 times that of the watermark. Hence, the size of the watermark will be M1 /12
× M2 /12 at most, where M1 and M2 are the length and width of the protected image. Hsieh et al. [20] used
the average LL 2 coeﬃcients of wavelet transformation and their relative positions in LL 2 as the distribution
basis to produce the share image. They also used the concept of pixel expansion, which makes the size of the
share image 2 × 2 times the size of the watermark. Therefore, the size of the watermark can only be M1 /8
× M2 /8 at most. Moreover, each block on their share images is distributed with diﬀerent numbers of black
pixels, i.e., 0–4, depending on diﬀerent situations (cf. Table 1 in [20]). This violates the security requirement
of visual cryptography. Lou et al. [21] also used wavelet transformation by comparing the coeﬃcients of the
medium frequency and the low frequency to produce the share image with size doubling. As the low-frequency
coeﬃcients must be larger than the coeﬃcients of the medium frequency, the comparison results are one-sided
inclined. To be specific, the results of f (i , j) and f ′ (i, j) calculated by Eqs. (2) and (5) in [21] are always
equal to 0, so that before and after attacks the public image and the original secret image are well matched,
which completely loses the sense of verification. Since Lou et al. adopted the 3-level wavelet transformation,
the size of the watermark can only be M1 /8 × M2 /8 times the original image. One common drawback of
the aforementioned works is that the size of the watermark should be much smaller than that of the protected
image. Their watermarks can only have a size of 1/144, 1/64, and 1/64, respectively, of the original image. In
addition, when extracting the watermark, Chang et al. needed to count the number of white dots in each 3 × 3
block to restore the corresponding color of the watermark. Hsieh et al. and Lou et al. needed to perform XOR
operations on the share image. All of these approaches are not able to take advantage of visual cryptography
to decrypt the secret information from the superimposed images using only the human visual system.
The proposed research employs the sampling method to pseudorandomly select 2 coeﬃcients (a, b) from
the wavelet-transformed coeﬃcients of the LL 3 region. These 2 coeﬃcient values are compared to determine the
color of the share image. According to the law of large numbers, the occurrences of (a ≥ b) and ( a ≤ b) have an
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equal opportunity. Thus, the generated share image will have randomly distributed half black dots and half white
dots to meet the security requirements of visual cryptography. Moreover, the number of the sampling process
is not limited to the size of the protected image or the watermark. This is quite diﬀerent from the approaches
of Chang et al., Hsieh et al., and Lou et al., which can only use a very small watermark. When extracting the
watermark, our method employs the practice of visual cryptography, which allows the watermark to emerge
naturally via superimposing the share images without the need for any complex mathematical operations.
To sum up the above descriptions, we make a comparison of our method with those of Chang et al. [19],
Hsieh et al. [20], and Lou et al. [21]. The results are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Comparisons of our study with the related works in the frequency domain.

Authors
Chang et al. [19]
Hsieh et al. [20]
Lou et al. [21]
Our method

Processing
method
DCT
2-level DWT
3-level DWT
3-level DWT

Share image/
watermark
3 × 3 times
2 × 2 times
2 × 1 times
1 × 1 time

Watermark/protected
image
1/12 × 1/12 times
1/8 × 1/8 times
1/8 × 1/8 times
Unlimited

Extracting
method
Superimposing + counting
XOR operation
XOR operation
Superimposing

4.2.2. The visual cryptography approaches
The basic idea of this series of studies is that every share image produced by visual cryptography has randomly
distributed 50% black dots and 50% white dots. From the point of view of coding theory, each share image can
be treated as composed of a series of 0s and 1s, and each has a chance of 50% occurrence. If we can produce
the 0/1 series that contains the original information from the protected digital asset, we can generate the share
image (master share) we need. Hou [12] retrieved the needed 0s and 1s from the highest bit-plane of the image.
The share image’s size was expanded to twice that of the embeded watermark. Hsu and Hou [13] compared
the sample means with the population mean to extract the 0s and 1s they needed. Their share image was
designed to be expanded to 2 × 2 times the embeded watermark. Hou and Huang [14] adopted a nonexpanded
design that compared 2 randomly selected pixel values to draw the 0s and 1s they needed. The scopes of the 3
aforementioned methods belong to the spatial domain category. This study, which adopted the use of the 3-level
wavelet transformation, employed a method of the frequency domain category. In this approach, 2 coeﬃcients
of the LL 3 region were compared to extract the desired 0s and 1s. It also employed a nonexpanded design.
The 4 aforementioned papers are all based on sampling inspection. Therefore, the size of their watermark is
not restricted to that of the protected image. The watermark extraction methods are also in accordance with
the spirit of visual cryptography, where the share images are directly superimposed to reveal watermarks. The
comparison of the results of the proposed method with those of [12–18] is shown in Table 4.
In addition, we used ‘Airplane’ as a subject on which to perform diﬀerent kinds of attacks. We compared
the results of the proposed method with those of [12–14]. The comparison results obtained are shown in Table 5.
Table 5 shows that in a variety of attacks, the NC values extracted from the watermark by this method
are generally better than those of [12–14]. Especially in the blurring, noising, distortion, JPEG, and rescaling
attacks, the NC values extracted by this method can have about a 2% increment compared to the methods of
[12–14].
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Table 4. The comparison of our study with the related works using visual cryptography.
Authors
Authors
Hou [12]
Hsu and Hou [13]
Hou and Huang [14]
Rawat and Raman [15]

Domain
Domain
Spatial
Spatial
Spatial
Frequency

Singh et al. [16]
Benyoussef et al. [17]

Frequency
Frequency

Luo et al. [18]

Frequency

Our method

Frequency

Processing method
method
Highest bit-plane
Sample mean
Pixel comparison
Singular value decomposition
Frame means
7 × 7 LL subblock
average
Discrete
fractional
random transform
LL3 coeﬃcient comparison

Share image
watermark
2 × 1 times
2 × 2 times
1 × 1 time
2 × 2 times

Watermark
protected image
Unlimited
Unlimited
Unlimited
<1

Extracting
method
Superimposing
Superimposing
Superimposing
Superimposing

2 × 2 times
2 × 1 times

<1
<1

Superimposing
Superimposing

1 × 1 time

<1

Superimposing

1 × 1 time

Unlimited

Superimposing

Table 5. The comparison of the resistance to attacks of the related works.
Attack type

PSNR value

Lightening 20
Darkening 20
Gaussian blurring 5
Sharpening 10
Noising 20
Geometric distortion 100
Jitter 16
JPEG 5
Cropping (1/2 × 1/2)
Rescaling 1/2

23.05
21.98
23.09
21.56
18.65
21.98
17.10
38.58
14.87
32.81

dB
dB
dB
dB
dB
dB
dB
dB
dB
dB

NC value
Hou [12]
97.48%
92.31%
93.63%
95.45%
83.86%
95.05%
88.97%
95.52%
93.67%
95.25%

Hsu and Hou [13]
97.72%
97.50%
91.66%
93.19%
82.90%
94.83%
82.25%
97.55%
80.44%
96.64%

Hou and Huang [14]
99.43%
99.39%
90.85%
92.49%
80.59%
95.88%
83.34%
99.43%
84.15%
97.24%

Our method
99.52%
99.39%
95.48%
92.55%
94.73%
98.18%
86.88%
99.44%
84.73%
99.28%

The reasons may be as follows. The operations of the practices in [12–14] are based directly on gray
values of the image. Once the image is attacked, each pixel value of that image may have been changed; the
images before and after the attacks may have some diﬀerences. Therefore, the master share, (M ′ ) generated by
the image after the attacks may also have some diﬀerences with the master share (M ) generated by the image
before the attacks. It creates a higher chance that the master shareat(M ′ ) will not match with the ownership
share ( O) at hand. However, data of the LL 3 low-frequency band are obtained from the average operation
of 64 corresponding pixel values. Because of the smooth eﬀect of the average operation, the variation of LL 3
coeﬃcients is much gentler (some pixel values may be increased while others may be decreased) through the
wavelet transformation.
Therefore, the master share ( M ) and the master share’ ( M ′ ) generated in this study from the LL 3 region
before and after attacks respectively can achieve a higher similarity. Table 6 shows that after blurring, noising,
distortion, JPEG, and rescaling attacks, the PSNR values obtained from the LL 3 region are higher than those
from the original image itself. This reveals that the variation of the sampling population (the original LL 3 ) of
our method is smaller than that of the population (the original image) adopted in [12–14]. The results of this
research show that the master share ( M ) and the ownership share (O) generated by combining the frequency
domain approach with the statistical property have a better robustness to attacks.
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Table 6. Diﬀerences between the original image and the LL 3 image after an attack.

Lightening 20

Darkening 20

PSNR = 23.05 dB

PSNR = 21.98 dB

PSNR = 23.06 dB

PSNR = 22.02 dB

After the attack
Original image
(512ŕ512)

After the attack
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Original LL3
(64ŕ
64)
Gaussian Blurring 5

Sharpening 10

Noising 20

Geometric distortion 100

PSNR = 23.09 dB

PSNR = 21.56 dB

PSNR = 18.65 dB

PSNR = 21.98 dB

PSNR = 28.63 dB
Jitter 16

PSNR = 24.74 dB
JPEG 5

PSNR = 36.08 dB
Cropping (1/2 1/2)

PSNR = 28.63 dB
Rescaling 1/2

PSNR = 17.10 dB

PSNR = 38.58 dB

PSNR = 14.87 dB

PSNR = 32.81 dB

PSNR = 19.36 dB

PSNR = 48.13 dB

PSNR = 15.01 dB

PSNR = 48.13 dB
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5. Conclusion
This study takes advantage of the easy decryption benefit of visual cryptography and applies the statistical law
of large numbers to produce an evenly distributed half-black and half-white share image. Based on the HWT, the
wavelet transformation coeﬃcients of the LL 3 region are used as the sample population. These LL 3 coeﬃcients
retain the most plentiful information about the original image, suﬀer less change from variations of single pixels,
and can make the coeﬃcient comparison results more stable based on the law of large numbers. Thus, even
when the protected image is under attack, the coeﬃcient comparison results are not easily changed. That is,
the master share’ from the attacked image and the master share from the original image are quite consistent.
Therefore, the NC value of the superimposed watermark can still be mostly maintained at 95% or more, which
reveals that our approach has good resistance to attacks. The advantages of the proposed image ownership
protection method include: 1) the watermark embedding scheme does not aﬀect the content of the original
image; 2) the watermark extraction scheme does not need the use of the original image; 3) the watermark’s size
is not restricted to the size of the protected image; 4) additionally, the nonexpanded approach also solves the
larger size problem of the share image.
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